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ABSTRACT 
 
Sergio Cremaschi’s L’etica del Novecento offers a clear and careful account of the development 
of ethical theory in English-language and German Philosophy. The focus on meta-ethics and 
normative concerns allows the author to offer a very concise, reliable and comprehensive 
overview of philosophical ethics. In this respect the book effectively fills the gap left by the 
lack of a good, updated history of ethics. Although those qualities establish Cremaschi’s work 
as a valuable reference book, a few doubts are raised about the highly theoretical approach 
adopted. On the one hand this choice proves not to be very hospitable to some traditions 
(like most of French philosophy, Marxism, Virtue ethics etc.) and overlooks the connections 
between ethics and the socio-historical world, with the effect of giving a picture of moral 
philosophy as a very abstract and academic discipline. On the other hand it is not clear 
whether the emergence of applied ethics is to be greeted as the culmination of the resurgence 
of normative ethics, or whether it is conspiring with other trends to undermine the whole 
enterprise of constructing normative theories. If, as I suspect, the latter is the case, the moral 
of Cremaschi’s narrative may be different from the one he suggests. 
 
 
1. Sergio Cremaschi’s L’etica del Novecento: Dopo Nietzsche(Carocci, Roma, 2005, 
pp. 282, € 23) is the first volume to appear of a trilogy aimed at covering the 
history of ethics. The other two volumes will cover moral philosophy from 
Pythagoras to scholasticism and from Grotius to Nietzsche respectively. The 
whole project is to be welcomed as it addresses a regrettable gap in 
philosophical publishing: not only is there no history of ethics in Italian, but 
also the international scene does not offer much on this topic. Furthermore the 
gap to be filled by the trilogy is one that needs filling, since the undeniable 
revival of ethics witnessed in the last forty years has failed to bring with it an 
adequate attention to the history of ethics, and it is hard to deny that much 
contemporary discussion suffers from a lack of familiarity with many strands of 
the western ethical tradition. If Cremaschi’s books will help to encourage a 
better knowledge of our ethical inheritance they will no doubt render a very 
valuable service to our philosophical culture. However, here I am concerned 
only with the volume dedicated to the 20th Century, a period that poses a 
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special kind of challenge, since the difficulty is not to bridge the distance with 
ways of thinking and feeling that are extremely remote from us, sometimes 
even outlandish, but rather to take a detached view that allows the author to 
discriminate between what is of lasting interest from what is more ephemeral.  
Let us begin to illustrate the task that Cremaschi has set for himself. He states 
his purposes at the beginning of his preface as being: 
1) to give a historical introduction to ethics;  
2) to follow the development of the discussion through the analysis of a selected 
number of authors; 
To these he adds a third which I am not sure I have grasped:  
3) to offer a picture of ethics not simply as a branch of philosophy but as an 
ongoing dialectic «between “moral” doctrines and their “ethical” enlightening» 
(p. 11). 
I thought that this was to be interpreted as an attempt to see ethical theories in 
the light of actual moral beliefs and practices, that is, not as an attempt to work 
out abstract systems of principles, but rather as an attempt to make explicit 
and sort out the morals of existing societies and communities. Such a project 
would deserve to be highly praised and welcomed and would have contributed 
to root ethics in the social, cultural and historical background from which it 
emerges. Moreover this would have served to meet the minimal historicist 
requirements that seem to be implied in producing a history of ethics. But this 
interpretation is soon shaken by the subsequent statement that the book is a 
history of ethical theories, not of the relations between ethics on the one hand 
and society, history, politics and literature on the other. And this qualification 
is fully confirmed by the content of the book: its subject is indeed an analysis of 
ethical (and meta-ethical) theories and not their contextualization. I must 
confess I could not find another interpretation of the meaning of Cremaschi’s 
third aim, nor could I persuade myself that that was not a purpose well worth 
pursuing. Thus I found myself unable to understand Cremaschi’s third aim and 
regretting that his history is so focussed on the philosophico-theoretical side of 
morality. 
However, one cannot fail to recognize that the failure to link ethical theories to 
their socio-historical background enables Cremaschi to cover a very large 
ground in a very short space: this broadness of scope and conciseness could have 
never been achieved while also offering contextualisation. In this respect it is 
worth noting that a maxim that Cremaschi has unfailingly followed throughout 
the book - with a Kantian zeal we may say! - is the avoidance of any digression, 
aside, anecdote and generally of anything that distracts the attention from the 
key features of the theories presented. The amount of information that he gives 
us in less the 300 pages is as amazing, as his ability to synthesize without 
trivializing and simplifying complex and difficult ideas is remarkable. These 
achievements cannot but be the outcome of a self-imposed iron discipline that 
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commands great respect and admiration. Of course, this gives the whole book a 
distinctly academical style and a certain dryness. But here one has to qualify 
such affirmations, to make clear that although Cremaschi makes no allowance 
to ornaments and rhetorical tricks to seduce the casual reader, he makes a 
consistent and successful effort to write in pure Italian and to avoid any 
unnecessary technicality and jargon. Combining concision with this clarity and 
simplicity is an achievement that deserves high praise - and if one considers the 
very poor editorial assistance that publishers nowadays offer, this achievement 
is even more praiseworthy.  
 
 
2. Let us now turn to the methodological directions that have guided 
Cremaschi’s work. He clearly states that the focus is on philosophical ethics, 
although this has not been wholly isolated from the developments of social 
sciences (or better Geistwissenschaften) and religious thinking, since some of 
these have had an important influence on philosophical debates, while 
contributions from disciplines such as biology, politics, anthropology have not 
had such an impact and have therefore been ignored. Also ignored is the 
thought of Foucault, on account of the little impact (and not of any lack of 
value or interest) of his work on moral philosophers. In practice this comes 
down to a treatment of Freud and Weber and to a whole chapter devoted to 
theologians and religious thinkers. Even though the chapter devoted to them is 
interesting, informative and valuable, yet the claim for their inclusion in the 
book - their influence of 20th century’s ethics - seems not to be wholly justified 
from what we read in the rest of the book, where those thinkers are almost 
never mentioned (only Barth is awarded a reference in another chapter of the 
book); in fact when it comes to that Freud does not score much better. This 
criticism is not directed towards their inclusion in the book, but rather towards 
the stated criterion for their inclusion and in favour of a broader one. 
Theologians and religious thinkers deserve to be included, but not because of 
their influence on philosophical ethical theories, but because of their great 
influence on culture and customs, i.e. on morals. For the same reason I would 
have discussed some anthropological theses that have given theoretical support 
to ethical relativism (for instance Ruth Benedict). This broader criterion would 
have allowed Cremaschi to deliver us a chapter on Foucault, which would have 
helped moral philosophers to take account of his contributions «as they 
deserve» (p. 12). 
Another methodological suggestion to justify inclusions and exclusions given by 
Cremaschi is that the thinkers had to be either English- or German-speaking, 
with only three French exceptions to this criterion (Levinas, Sartre, Beauvoir  -
what a pity that Simone Weil was not included). Further reasons for this 
geographico-linguistic curtailing are not offered. My conjecture is that 
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Cremaschi sees western philosophy as constituted mainly by three main cultural 
traditions related to three broad cultural and linguistic areas: Anglo-Saxon, 
French and Germanic. These are the traditions that have established 
themselves as having a super-national relevance and have therefore gained a 
superior status and importance. The further reason for partially excluding the 
French area is that notwithstanding relevant and lasting differences German 
and English-speaking philosophy have managed to establish a fruitful dialogue 
and to converge over a similar understanding of ethics, while French philosophy 
in the 20th century has either showed little interest for ethics or pursued ethical 
inquiries along lines that have failed to attract much attention in the 
international community of moral philosophers. In short, I think that 
Cremaschi believes that Anglo-Saxon and German ethics have played the major 
role in defining the topic and the methods of ethics in the 20th century, and 
perhaps they also present more continuity with the preceding tradition. If I am 
right, there is an obvious element of truth in these ideas, since it is undeniable 
that today there exists a well established and recognizable international 
community of philosophers doing ethics along the lines of the Anglo-German 
tradition.  
If quarrelling over this choice may be beside the point, there is an observation 
which is instead worth making. In focusing on the traditions that have 
established for themselves a recognised international standing, Cremaschi seems 
to opt for a kind of objective, impersonal strategy of selection. The schools and 
authors are not singled out according to some explicit understanding of the 
subject and task of ethics, but rather in light of their ability to establish an 
influence and a standing for themselves. It almost looks like an ‘impact’ 
criterion for inclusion: whatever succeeds in gaining influence and visibility in 
the international academic world deserves attention. Such a strategy presents 
three main shortcomings. First, it presents a risk of self-referentiality, since the 
set of cultural circles (universities, journals and publishers) that are selected for 
measuring the relevance and impact of different authors and schools will 
determine the outcome, and it will do so not only on the basis of intellectual 
merits, but also national, linguistic, economic, power, gender, racial factors will 
play a role. This perhaps is too bold a suspicion, but the more modest worry is 
that first there has been a choice of what counts as a respectable philosophical 
community today and then a genealogy of it has been constructed. 
The second problem of this “impartial spectator’s” strategy is that it presents a 
curious contrast with the choice of focussing only on ethical theories. I see a 
puzzling asymmetry between the critical, rationalistic conception of ethics 
adopted (focussing on philosophical, speculative ethics and excluding positive 
morality, morals, Sittlichkeit) and the positive, sociological, a-critical conception 
of importance chosen. Alternatively, one might wonder whether behind the 
choice there is the author’s own (easily guessed at) preference for a given 
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tradition of ethical thinking and that the story told is ultimately a vindication 
of the rationalistic ethics which is the heir of the Enlightenment. Indeed, 
reading the back cover and some of the remarks at page 12, it is hard to resist 
the impression that Cremaschi has written the success story of the post-war 
defeat of the destructors of reason by the grandchildren of the Enlightenment. I 
am not claiming that this story is false or uninteresting or unacceptably 
ideological, but only that Cremaschi would have done better to be more frank 
about the value-assumptions that lies at the basis of his subject-matter and 
methodological choices. Such choices are, after all, defensible and can be 
respected and acknowledged even by those who do not share them. Moreover, I 
think that a complete frankness about his cultural aim (vindicating the 
richness, fecundity and force of rational discourses on normative ethics) would 
have made even more apparent Cremaschi’s intellectual honesty and fair-
mindedness: qualities that can be appreciated throughout the whole book.  
The third weakness of the ‘impact’ criterion of inclusion is that it gives very 
little help in giving a definite structure and plan to the book. I think that this 
difficulty becomes apparent if we turn to a short analysis of the content of the 
book and of the subdivision of chapters. 
 
 
3. Let us quickly summarize the historiographical hypothesis put forward by 
Cremaschi. It is briskly outlined in the back cover. In the first half of the 
century scepticism about normative ethics prevails both in the English-
speaking and in the German world. The trend is overthrown in 1958: from that 
year normative ethics regain the centre of the scene, but at the same time a 
silent takeover is taking place: applied ethics undermines the idea that the 
business of ethics is to deal with its rational foundations and little by little 
affirms the more modest and pragmatic aim of finding reasonable agreements 
and convergences on urgent and pressing issues. However, the plan of the book 
does not reflect this hypothesis, and adopts instead that impartial observer 
attitude of someone who is merely recording the events. The neutral chronicle 
approach works fairly well for the first six chapters - although 5 and 6 already 
show a certain lack of obvious thematic unity - that cover roughly the first 
sixty years of the century. Chapter 7 on theologians and religious thinkers, clear 
and interesting as it is, remains in my view an external body not obviously 
integrated in the book. Chapters 8 to 10 illustrate the avowed revival of 
normative ethics, chapter 11 deals with applied ethics and chapter 12 illustrates 
the new twists and turns of meta-ethics in the last forty years. 
What is wrong with the illustrated plan? Two flaws emerge while reading the 
book. One is that it tells a story without a narrative or a plot. I am not 
suggesting that Cremaschi should have produced a Hegelian history of ethics 
with a clear direction and a rational dialectic that necessarily leads from every 
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stage to the following, but the structure of the book is on the whole loose and, 
paradoxically, sometimes one would have preferred it even more so. The 
problem is that there is no clear and consistent line along which the narrative is 
unfolded. Cremaschi makes use of several criteria to order and group his 
chapters: there is a certain chronological line, but loose; there are geographical 
criteria, but they are often broken; sometimes a chapter is built around 
normative affinities, sometimes around a recognizable ethical tradition, 
sometimes on the convergence on an issue from different starting points. In at 
least one case the grouping is random, not to say misleading. I am thinking of 
chapter nine («Normative ethics: neo-aristotelianisms and virtue ethics») which 
conflates Arendt, Gadamer, MacIntyre, Hampshire, Williams, and feminist 
ethics. The chapter is incoherent because it groups together thinkers who are 
offering first and foremost a diagnosis of an epoch and attempt to indicate the 
way out of the traps of modernity (Arendt, Gadamer and MacIntyre), with 
thinkers who are sceptical about the claims of normative ethical theories 
(Hampshire and Williams) and thinkers who are trying to break away from the 
traditional paradigms of Western ethics and to work in new directions, that in 
some respect raise challenges that are akin to those that emerged from 
environmental ethics and multiculturalism. None of the thinkers here grouped 
can be considered a representative of a tradition of ethical thought that seeks to 
work out the rational foundations of morality and to derive normative 
prescriptions from them. And I want here to stress that nothing of what 
Cremaschi says of them suggests that they do. So I am not accusing him of 
giving a distorted portrait of their positions and points of view (he does not: as 
usual his presentation is accurate), but merely of classifying them under a 
misleading label. The effect of this mislabelling is not altogether innocuous, 
because it contributes to giving an image of contemporary philosophical ethics 
as dominated by the concern of constructing normative theories. 
 
 
4. Some critical remarks are also raised by Chapter 11, which is devoted to the 
rebirth of applied ethics and is at the same time one of the best and most 
infuriating. It is incredibly rich in clear and reliable information, as is the rest of 
the book, and it also has a greater liveliness that makes it particularly gripping 
and pacy, so that the reader’s attention never drops. I think that a reason for 
this more seductive character of this chapter is that it has a definite narrative, 
as well as a brief but helpful historical contextualization, that helps the reader 
to set the rich data into a clear framework. The chapter begins by giving a short 
social, political and historical background to the emergence of applied ethics 
and then, succinctly but effectively, illustrates some of the main trends that 
emerged in this field and the theoretical challenges that they have posed to 
philosophical ethics. Here Cremaschi is at his very best and this part of the 
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chapter is a pleasure to read. In a few pages the reader learns a lot and is led by 
the author’s admirable ability to summarize concisely and by his secure 
judgment in singling out what is really important and fundamental. It is a 
pleasure to be led by Cremaschi’s learning, scholarly accuracy and fair-
mindedness. 
After bioethics Cremaschi turns to public ethics and gives us an account of the 
ideas of Rawls, Nozick, Dworkin and Sen. Once again Cremaschi’s knowledge 
and reliability offers no occasion for criticism. What then is there to infuriate in 
so excellent a chapter? Before answering let me go back to the initial paragraph 
of the chapter, which has a particular interest since it provides some further 
indications about the general hypotheses that underlie the structure of the 
book. According to Cremaschi, around 1880 Sidgwick and Nietzsche 
undermined philosophers’ trust in the possibility of normative ethics, but such 
impossibility did not have terribly disquieting effects, since it was accompanied 
by a widespread faith in the existence of a wide and substantial agreement 
among civilized humans on fundamental values and norms. So if normative 
ethics was impossible, that was not a serious problem since it wasn’t really 
needed either. This accounts for the prominence of meta-ethics in the English-
speaking world and for the reluctance of European philosophers to propose 
concrete normative guidelines, even by those authors that vindicated the 
possibility of normative theories. In short, directives on how to behave where 
left to the individual’s choice in the light of his grasp of a more or less 
acknowledged common sense morality. This cultural climate finally broke down 
at the end of the Fifties, when in both cultural areas a revival of normative 
ethics took place and applied ethics began to emerge in the Anglo-Saxon world. 
Cremaschi does not give any suggestions about the reasons that prompted the 
return of normative ethics, while he ventures some hypotheses about the 
motives that caused the emergence of applied ethics. He mentions the following: 
the Vietnam War, the American civil rights movement, the growing awareness 
of the problem of underdevelopment in the Third World, innovations in 
medicine and health care, ecological concerns.  
Let me try to tease out what are the conclusions that Cremaschi seems to 
suggest that can be drawn from this picture. The age of meta-ethics was useful 
to sharpen the conceptual tools of moral philosophers, but was at the same time 
a retreat into an ivory tower on the part of philosophers, and perhaps even a 
partial dereliction of duty. Hence what took place from the end of the Fifties 
was healthy and liberating. It is less clear what are the respective roles and the 
reciprocal relations between normative and applied ethics in effecting the 
change of agenda in moral philosophy. The impression is that up to a certain 
point the two strands have worked towards the same goal - restoring ethics’ 
practical relevance for urgent issues - although from different corners: 
normative ethics proceeding top-down, while applied ethics working bottom-up. 
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However, it looks like little by little applied ethics has undermined the 
ambitions and the importance of normative general theories, showing that more 
pragmatic approaches not only can do without theories, but actually work 
better in their absence. At least this is the impression that I gain from reading 
Cremaschi’s account of the bioethical trends, though he does not explicitly 
advocates any such conclusion. But if my impression is not misguided, then 
applied ethics turns out to be closer to some of the outcomes of the primacy of 
meta-ethics: namely we don’t need comprehensive ethical theories to solve 
moral puzzles. In this respect it seems also to converge with the so-called anti-
theorists - a trend unfortunately overlooked by Cremaschi - according to which 
normative ethical theories are a misguided and useless enterprise. Yet, this 
impression needs to be mitigated by noticing an important difference between 
the scepticism towards theory recommended respectively by positivism and 
irrationalism in late 19th and early 20th century on the one hand, and applied 
ethics (and anti-theorists) in the late 20th century. While the former undermined 
the role of reason in practical decision and yielded to decisionism - or 
voluntarism - ; the latter does not recommend the obliteration of reason, but 
rather a less ambitious use thereof, aiming at consent, compromise and 
agreement rather than at true and compelling clear-cut solutions. Normativity 
within the limits of plural reasons, one might suggest, paraphrasing Kant! And 
from this remark arises my complaint for not having treated the emergence of 
ethical pluralism in a theoretical form. In the English-speaking area a good 
number of important philosophers have tried to urge the necessity of 
acknowledging the reality and inescapability of moral pluralism: Berlin, 
Hampshire, Williams, Stocker, Kekes, Larmore, Bauman. Interestingly enough 
this brings us back to Weber’s politheism of values―which in turn is indebted 
to Nietzsche’s perspectivism―although in a different cultural climate, and thus 
with different, less radical and pessimistic, results.  
 
 
5. Let me now come back to the reasons of my irritation. First, chapter 11 
suggests that applied ethics has a relevance - both theoretical and practical - 
well worth a broader and more inclusive treatment. Cremaschi mentions several 
branches of inquiry that have gained academic acceptance: ethics of 
international relations and war, business ethics, environmental ethics, animal 
ethics (he could have added media ethics), but he only deals with medical ethics 
(and public ethics, but I’ll come to this soon). This is a very regrettable loss, 
especially considering the importance and relevance of the moral issues related 
to war and weapons of mass destruction, and with environmental worries. The 
questions of collective and group responsibility raised by the Holocaust, by the 
use of the atom bomb, by the massacre of civilians (e.g. the infamous My Lai 
massacre) have prompted philosophical reflection of paramount importance and 
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I believe that some reference to the Schuldfrage debate in Germany and to such 
authors as Jaspers, Anders, Russell and Jonas would have been to the point.  
Second, the chapter shows how helpful it is to have even a short historical 
contextualisation, and the readers would have had an easier task in ordering the 
wealth of information delivered by the book if the reflections found at pp. 217-8 
had been given earlier, and possibly articulated a bit further. 
Finally I strongly disagree with assimilating public ethics to applied ethics. 
Apart from my personal dislike for the proliferation of such labels as public 
ethics, that only tend to encourage the consolidation of self-centred and self-
referential disciplines, I think that it is very questionable even to draw close 
boundaries between ethics, political philosophy and legal philosophy. Such 
disciplines are too closely intertwined in the western tradition to allow any 
strict separation, especially in works as broad in scope as the present one. 
Surely Cremaschi neither wants to claim that Plato’s Republic, or Kant’s 
Metaphysics of Morals are works of applied ethics, nor that Plato’s Laws, 
Hobbes’s Elements of Law Natural and Political, Hegel’s Outlines of a philosophy 
of right are merely works of legal philosophy. But then why does he confine 
Rawls’s work to the section of applied ethics? This to me makes no sense at all. 
First, the importance of Rawls is such that in Cremaschi’s own volume there is 
only one other 20th century’s author who manages to be mentioned more often 
(G.E. Moore). Every serious anthology of normative ethics features some 
contribution from Rawls (but very few readers in applied ethics do). There is no 
question that Rawls’s writings played a major contribution in the normative 
revival that emerged at the end of the Fifties. Papers like Outline of a Decision 
Procedure for Ethics (1951), Two Concepts of Rules (1955), Justice as Fairness 
(1958), The Sense of Justice (1963), are by no means pieces of applied ethics and 
have been enormously influential. The proper place of Rawls would have been 
in chapter 10 (Normative ethics: Kantian and rights-based theories). Not 
having done so produces some quite bizarre results; Gauthier, Arendt and 
Habermas turn out to have more importance than Rawls as ethical theorists, 
and one might wonder why Harsanyi and Harrod (and Arrow) are treated as 
ethical theorists while Sen and Nussbaum as applied ethicists. Obviously there 
is something wrong with this. Similarly, there is something wrong in the 
complete forgetfulness of the philosophy of law. Certainly a few words about 
legal positivism and Kelsen would have thrown some further light on the 
heyday of non-cognitivism, and a treatment of Hart would have illuminated 
further the reaction against this climate; besides it would have provided a more 
suitable setting for Dworkin and perhaps for other neglected figures like 
Perelman, Alexy, Raz. Incidentally it is worth mentioning that a lively debate 
on the philosophy of punishment was one of the first manifestations of the 
renewed practical concerns of philosophers in the Fifties. 
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There are other good reasons for not considering public ethics as a branch of 
applied ethics and as separate from normative ethics. I have already mentioned 
that there are good historical reasons for keeping public and private morality 
together (which does not mean that they cannot be distinguished, indeed in 
many cases they need be separated) and further reasons can be added. I shall 
quickly mention just a few. Utilitarianism, which has an important place in the 
book, was born as a public ethic and only after World War Two was proposed 
as a personal morality as well (with poor results). In its more credible forms it is 
still presented as a public morality. Very few of the ethical theories presented 
(Moore, the existentialists, the theologians, the virtue ethicists) have much to 
say in matters of private morality and not much attention is given to this side 
of ethics throughout the book (which clearly accepts the idea of the priority of 
the right over the good, an idea that thanks to Cremaschi now I know we owe 
to Prichard). Incidentally, the difficulty in finding a place and giving a proper 
treatment of virtue ethics stems from this general approach, and ends up in 
accepting the - misleading, but unfortunately well established - commonplace 
that virtue ethics is a third kind of normative ethics, next to consequentialism 
and deontology, while contemporary virtue ethics is mainly an attempt to 
change the agenda and the methods of philosophical ethics, and in this respect 
it bears more resemblance with feminism, particularism, anti-theory and 
applied ethics than with consequentialism and deontology. Finally, it would 
have been helpful to say a few words about the socio-historical reasons that 
have contributed to make public ethics such a major concern for moral 
philosophers in the 20th century. The tension between the spread of 
individualist and libertarian aspirations and rhetoric on the one hand and the 
sense of impotence, alienation and meaninglessness fostered by mass society, 
bureaucratization and the triumph of mighty organizations (nation states and 
capitalist corporations) have certainly played a major role in urging the need to 
work out ways to give back some power and control to the individual through 
the construction of public spaces hospitable to ethical concerns. A chapter 
devoted to the authors who have engaged with the task of producing diagnoses 
of the predicaments of modernity would have helped in bringing such issues to 
the surface. It is worth noting that the book itself features a valuable list of 
authors that would have made up a good chapter: Weber, Freud, Adorno and 
Horkeimer, Heidegger, Gadamer, Arendt, Habermas and MacIntyre. 
Unfortunately scattered in various different chapters they fail to make much 
impression and they are easily forgotten as minor figures in the (ghost-) 
narrative of the book. 
 
 
6. I speak of a ghost-narrative because it is not explicit enough to represent a 
helpful framework for the reader, while it obviously affects the choice of 
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inclusions and exclusions. The problem is that Cremaschi is committed to 
bringing us good news about ethics, its usefulness and robustness. Such hidden 
optimism vitiates against the narrative because it risks either to eliminate or to 
curtail with a cordon sanitaire the unwelcome guests at the ethical symposium: 
nihilists, sceptics, relativists, stubborn post-modernists, anti-theorists, deep 
pessimists etc. The final picture of the metaphorical ethical symposium should 
not look too bad: we are told, after all, that the present situation is the best 
possible scenario, with people sitting around the table and exchanging reasons 
on serious issues with good will. No doubt there is much truth in that picture. 
But not the whole of the truth, and we should not be satisfied with anything 
less. The problem is not so much that at the ethical table some people have not 
been invited and some others are behaving either rudely or annoyingly, that is 
refusing to play the game favoured by the majority. Although this is true, this 
is not the worst feature of the picture. The most disquieting feature of the 
metaphor of the dinner table is that it is something more than a metaphor: it 
captures the weight and the impact that ethical discourse has on the 
contemporary world: more or less that of dinner table chats. Outside the 
philosophical symposium described by Cremaschi, nihilism, scepticism, 
mistrust, glib relativism, disillusionment, fanaticism, prejudice, selfishness and 
power struggles are alive and kicking. (Would this situation have appeared 
more understandable had, say, Jung, Schmitt, Luhmann, Strauss, Morgenthau, 
Girard, Bataille, Deleuze, Foucault, Croce, Gramsci, Oakeshott, Bloom, Rorty 
been included in the book?) And now who is to blame? Is the world too stupid 
and ignorant? Or are the philosophers a bit alienated from the world?  
Is it really possible that a community of philosophers that live in societies that 
went through two devastating world wars were not at all affected by that? Did 
they really take a further fifteen years after the end of World War II to get rid 
of the spell of meta-ethics and decisionism? And yet from the account offered 
by Cremaschi it looks like historical events did not affect them until the noise 
from the outside world upset the quiet life of their universities in the Sixties. I 
repeat the question: are the philosophers a bit alienated from the world? 
(Curiously, from this point of view theologians come out much better). Or is 
Cremaschi offering us a picture which is too partial? I think that most 
philosophers in the past century have avoided engagement with the world and 
the hard issues raised by historical events. Cremaschi did not falsify the picture, 
but his choice of focussing on the more theoretical side of moral reflection has 
left little space for attempts of some philosophers to deal directly - i.e. without 
the mediation of theories - with the big questions of their time. In this way the 
impression that ethics is a flight from reality has been reinforced. As a 
consequence it is easy to predict that sceptics and pessimists will see their 
suspicion that ethics is an idle and useless enterprise confirmed, while the 
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optimists will be more impressed by the happy ending represented by the 
picture of the well-intentioned discussion mentioned above. 
 
 
7. In conclusion how does Cremaschi’s book fulfil his task of filling the gap 
represented by the lack of a good history of 20th century ethics? Thanks to its 
wealth of information and accurate scholarship the book will prove to be an 
extremely valuable reference for all those interested in philosophical ethics. It 
offers a very exhaustive, accurate and reliable account of the development of 
ethical theories in the English-speaking world, but its theoretical framework 
and plan does not prove as well-suited for accounting for German and French 
contributions. Had the book been presented as an encyclopaedia of ethical 
theory in the 20th century and the content arranged alphabetically, I would 
have unconditionally praised it. As a history it is open to some complaints on 
account of the lack of historical rooting and of a plan that excludes too much to 
be an impartial chronicle and that is not bold and explicit enough to offer a 
helpful narrative. However, we cannot expect a single book to satisfy all 
possible demands. Cremaschi has done an admirable job and if it will stimulate 
alternative histories of moral philosophy - and of morality at large - capable of 
dealing with issues overlooked in his account, that would be a further reason to 
welcome his brave and pioneering attempt to write a much needed history of 
ethics.  
